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between being and goodness deserves to be his most celebrated doctrine con-
cerning esse. 
My misgivings about this little book are far outweighed by my admiration of 
it. It is what I will recommend to any non-specialist colleague or student who 
wants a good, brief, philosophical introduction to Aquinas. 
The Effectiveness of Causes, by Dorothy Emmett. Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1985. pp. x + 136. Cloth $34.50; paper $14.95. 
Reviewed by RICHARD E. CREEL, Ithaca College. 
Emmett's Causes is an important contribution to analytic and speculative 
metaphysics, and though most of her references are to analytic philosophers, 
she discusses several idealist philosophers and acknowledges a large debt to the 
middle works of A.N. Whitehead. 
The first thrust of Causes is to show that the Humean analysis of causation, 
i.e., 'event-causation,' is unsatisfactory. According to event-causation the basic 
constituents of reality are events that occur and perish instantaneously. Con-
sequently, the appearance of change in an enduring object and of efficient cau-
sation between objects are illusions. 
Emmett argues that memory makes it impossible for us to believe this interpre-
tation of causation. "On the model of causation as a sequence of events, a present 
state succeeds a past state, and that is all there is to be said. But memory suggests 
there is a great deal more to be said. What has happened in the past has had 
real effects in making us what we are ... " [93]. "We cannot doubt that our 
present life is shaped by past experiences" [91]. "Our primitive experience is of 
the derivation of what is going on in the present from what was going on in the 
immediate past" [88]. 
The way out of the Zeno-universe of event -causation is to start with the position 
that the basic constituents of reality are things, not events. Events are secondary 
to things, occurring because the actions of things upon one another cause trans-
actions, impacts, operations that result in change of one sort or another, including 
the persistence of an object from one moment to the next. 
A cause is "something on which something happening to something else 
depends" [87]. Emmett distinguishes two types of cause. In transeunt causation 
there is "a product apart from the activity of producing," as when one thing acts 
upon another. In immanent causation "the product is not separable from the 
activity producing it," as in a dance or a recollection. Transeunt causation depends 
upon immanent causation because the transeunt impact of one individual on 
another presupposes the persistence of each while the causal transaction takes 
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place and the effects are carried forward. 
A person is an organism that, like all organisms, is a functioning system 
characterized by a pattern of development, maturation, senescence, and death. 
These changes are generated by immanent causation. Hence, mind and body are 
not different substances acting upon one another; they are "a unity with different 
levels of functioning which affect each other" [105]. 
In her final chapter Emmett asks in what sense God could be the cause of 
anything. God cannot be a transeunt cause because God cannot be external to 
anything in the appropriate sense, and nothing can be independent of God in the 
appropriate sense. However, God can be related to the world as immanent cause, 
and Emmett confesses herself to be forced by the existence of creativity to believe 
that there is "a basic kind of immanent causation in organisms as active systems" 
[108] . 
Emmett uses the mind-body relation to explicate the relation of God to each 
person. As the mind expresses itself through the body, grace expresses itself 
through the mind-forming and transforming it, sustaining, renewing, inspiring 
it. That we have such experiences of renewal, etc., cannot be doubted; nor can 
it be doubted that they feel as though they well up from within us from beyond 
us. Moreover, "If [this] transforming power comes up through deep energies of 
the psyche, from a root where mental and physiological are hardly distinguished, 
it may indeed be the working in human life of a creative power which is also 
efficacious at other levels of nature in whatever forms are open to them" [119]. 
This does not mean that the universe should be thought of as a single organism. 
It should be thought of as a nexus of individuals dynamically cross-related but 
not coordinated in an external way, as, say, the parts of a loom are coordinated 
by a machinist, or the interplay of the ponies, dogs, and parakeets of an animal 
act are coordinated by their trainer. The only teleology effected by grace is 
effected from within each individual. The notion of divine teleology imposed 
from without must be cast out along with that of divine transeunt causation. 
Now I would like to raise four questions. First, on 115 Emmett rejects flatly 
the notion that God can be thought of as a person over against other persons. 
Does this mean that for her "God" is only a functional term that refers to whatever 
it is that forms and transforms us, renews and inspires us, a La John Dewey or 
H.N. Wieman? 
Second, Emmett rejects classical dualism, holding that mind and body are 
substantially continuous with one another, and she insists that grace operates on 
us only immanently, as the mind operates upon the body. Does that not suggest 
that as mind-body is one substance, so grace-mind-body is one substance? So 
why does she not embrace some form of pantheism [115]? 
Third, Emmett proposes that as the mind acts upon the body, so grace acts 
upon the mind. This seems to imply determinism because the body is ordinarily 
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thought to be under the control of the mind when one is acting; by analogy it 
would follow that the mind is under the control of grace when it is at work. Yet 
it seems clear that Emmett is a libertarian. Hence, she needs to explain why the 
parallelism that she claims regarding mind-body causation and grace-mind cau-
sation does not imply determinism--{)r in what respects it does and in what 
respects it does not. 
Finally, Emmett says nothing about the problem of evil; consequently her 
notion of efficacious grace seems somewhat sentimentalistic. She speaks of 
efficacious grace as "a deep creative power which, instead of feeding a ruthless 
will to live, can feed a will to love, purifying the self-centeredness of the 
will ... " [118-9]. If this power is, as Emmett implies, the same one that is 
immanently at the base of the existence and persistence of all things, then either 
it must also account for physical afflictions, mental afflictions, urges to violence, 
etc., or there must be two powers at the base of all things--{)ne beneficent, one 
demonic. Perhaps there is a better solution, but Emmett cannot on the one hand 
paint a picture of "a deep creative power" that encourages our will to love, and 
on the other hand imply that it is the same power that is immanently at the base 
of all things, without creating in her readers a sense of dissonance that cries out 
for resolution. 
Emmett might reply that some of my questions are unfair, as she undertook 
to write only a monograph. Fair enough. Indeed, I add that she covers very well 
an astonishing amount of material in the space of so brief a book-including 
wonderfully handled issues that I have not yet mentioned, e.g., "total cause," 
"cause as selective factor," "linear and multiple causation," "action," and "per-
sistence as the simplest form of change." We are very fortunate to have these 
fruits of her research and reflections. I hope we will be further enriched by her 
answers to the questions above. 
